Theory of exit choice: IPOs vs acquisitions with differential bargaining

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Chinchwadkar, Rohan
dc.contributor.author	Seth, Rama
dc.date.accessioned	2021-08-26T05:55:28Z	-
dc.date.available	2021-08-26T05:55:28Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013
dc.identifier.uri	http://www.joebm.com/papers/11-F00001.pdf
dc.identifier.uri	https://ir.iimcal.ac.in:8443/jspui/handle/123456789/965	-
dc.description	Rama Seth, Department of Finance & Control, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Kolkata; Rohan Chinchwadkar, Doctoral Student, Department of Finance & Control, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Kolkata;
dc.description	pp.46-48
dc.description	DOI - 10.7763/JOEBM.2013.V1.11 46
dc.description.abstract	This paper introduces differential bargaining into the Bayar and Chemmanur (2011) model of exit choice between IPOs and acquisitions and shows that a mixed strategy equilibrium can exist for both high (H) type and low (L) type firms. Using the concept of signaling games and perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we prove for the first time in a theoretical framework that PE investors are inclined to take more type H firms public than entrepreneurs.
dc.publisher	AR-IIMC
dc.publisher	Journal of Economics, Business and Management
dc.relation.ispartofseries	1(1)
dc.subject	Private equity exits
dc.subject	Initial public offering
dc.subject	Acquisitions
dc.subject	Signaling games
dc.title	Theory of exit choice: IPOs vs acquisitions with differential bargaining
dc.type	Article
Appears in Collections:	Finance and Control

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