Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ir.iimcal.ac.in:8443/jspui/handle/123456789/885
Title: On Allocation Contests for Publicly Provided Goods
Authors: Sen, Arijit
Keywords: Allocation contests
Merit goods
Publicly provided goods
Rival goods
Issue Date: 2018
Publisher: SCOPUS
South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance
SAGE Publications Ltd
Series/Report no.: 7(1)
Abstract: In many countries, the government provides goods and services that are rival in consumption�essential commodities, such as water, public transportation and basic health care, and merit goods like professional education and tertiary health care. For such goods, the government has to specify allocation rules under which citizens can access them. Affluent citizens often have the incentive and the ability to influence public allocation rules by engaging in allocation contests. This article presents simple models of allocation contests for a divisible essential commodity and an indivisible merit good, and studies contest equilibria and their implications for social outcomes. Given allocation contests over public provision, falling public supply of an essential commodity can have magnified negative impact on social welfare, and raising the reservation quota of a publicly provided merit good for a set of disadvantaged citizens might effectively lower their access to the good. JEL: C72, D61, H42. � 2018, � 2018 SAGE Publications.
Description: Sen, Arijit, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Kolkata, India
ISSN/ISBN - 22779787
pp.1-16
DOI - 10.1177/2277978718760445
URI: https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85047096039&doi=10.1177%2f2277978718760445&partnerID=40&md5=0e3527e3fdc19a3780878d292b5c33a7
https://ir.iimcal.ac.in:8443/jspui/handle/123456789/885
Appears in Collections:Economics

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