Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ir.iimcal.ac.in:8443/jspui/handle/123456789/882
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dc.contributor.authorAndersson, Tommy B.
dc.contributor.authorMukherjee, Conan
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-26T05:54:58Z-
dc.date.available2021-08-26T05:54:58Z-
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85071489604&doi=10.1080%2f10242694.2019.1660839&partnerID=40&md5=c787a23008cf27c67d3e22e7d8591c6f
dc.identifier.urihttps://ir.iimcal.ac.in:8443/jspui/handle/123456789/882-
dc.descriptionAndersson, Tommy B., Lund University, Department of Economics, Lund, Sweden; Mukherjee, Conan, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Economics Group, Kolkata, India
dc.descriptionISSN/ISBN - 10242694
dc.descriptionpp.253-270
dc.descriptionDOI - 10.1080/10242694.2019.1660839
dc.description.abstractThis paper models �no war, no peace� situations in a game theoretical framework where two countries are engaged in a standoff over a military sector. The first main objective is to identify rational grounds for such situations and, more precisely, for the explicit equilibria that lead to such situations. It is demonstrated that both countries gain the same payoff from being in this continuous state of perpetual hostility and, moreover, that �no war, no peace� situations can be explained only if the countries perceive an equal measure of military advantage from controlling the area. Given this insight, the second objective of the paper is to provide insights about how �no war, no peace� situations can be resolved. Two different pathways are suggested. The first is idealistic and based on mutual trust, whereas the second is based on deterrence, involving both countries imposing a threat of using armed force against the other country in their respective military doctrines. � 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
dc.publisherSCOPUS
dc.publisherDefence and Peace Economics
dc.publisherRoutledge
dc.relation.ispartofseries32(3)
dc.subjectGame theory
dc.subjectinfinite horizon game
dc.subjectSiachen conflict
dc.subjectstationary strategies
dc.subjectNo war - no peace
dc.titleSeeking No War, Achieving No Peace: The Conflict over the Siachen Glacier
dc.typeArticle
Appears in Collections:Economics

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