Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ir.iimcal.ac.in:8443/jspui/handle/123456789/882
Title: Seeking No War, Achieving No Peace: The Conflict over the Siachen Glacier
Authors: Andersson, Tommy B.
Mukherjee, Conan
Keywords: Game theory
infinite horizon game
Siachen conflict
stationary strategies
No war - no peace
Issue Date: 2019
Publisher: SCOPUS
Defence and Peace Economics
Routledge
Series/Report no.: 32(3)
Abstract: This paper models �no war, no peace� situations in a game theoretical framework where two countries are engaged in a standoff over a military sector. The first main objective is to identify rational grounds for such situations and, more precisely, for the explicit equilibria that lead to such situations. It is demonstrated that both countries gain the same payoff from being in this continuous state of perpetual hostility and, moreover, that �no war, no peace� situations can be explained only if the countries perceive an equal measure of military advantage from controlling the area. Given this insight, the second objective of the paper is to provide insights about how �no war, no peace� situations can be resolved. Two different pathways are suggested. The first is idealistic and based on mutual trust, whereas the second is based on deterrence, involving both countries imposing a threat of using armed force against the other country in their respective military doctrines. � 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Description: Andersson, Tommy B., Lund University, Department of Economics, Lund, Sweden; Mukherjee, Conan, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Economics Group, Kolkata, India
ISSN/ISBN - 10242694
pp.253-270
DOI - 10.1080/10242694.2019.1660839
URI: https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85071489604&doi=10.1080%2f10242694.2019.1660839&partnerID=40&md5=c787a23008cf27c67d3e22e7d8591c6f
https://ir.iimcal.ac.in:8443/jspui/handle/123456789/882
Appears in Collections:Economics

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