Implications of (un)awareness for decision‑making in strategic interaction: another take on the Prisoner’s dilemma

Abstract

Focusing on the behavior and outcomes, Prisoner’s dilemma research rarely encompasses the examination of the effects of (un)awareness. To bridge the research gap, the aim is to outline the deviations that stem from the (un)awareness and to assess its impact on the in-game reasoning, outcome, and modeling. More precisely, through a thought experiment, the overview conceptually encompasses the effects of (un)awareness of game elements (actions, players, and payoffs), differing between awareness in a narrow and broad sense. The deviations due to (un)awareness of game elements show how the game can deviate from the proposed model, whereby unawareness and skewed awareness of the players bear the most prominent differences. Compiling the most notable deviations provokes second thoughts on game theory modeling. The findings on each deviation are shortly discussed and extended to two practical examples to illustrate possible implications.