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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Bhattacharyya, Asish K | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-09-06T05:10:30Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-09-06T05:10:30Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020-08 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ir.iimcal.ac.in:8443/jspui/handle/123456789/3946 | - |
dc.description | Biosketch: Asish K Bhattacharyya is the founder of Nonlinear Insights. He was a Professor at the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta and Indian Institute of Corporate Affairs. Also, he was Director of the Institute of Management Technology Ghaziabad and the Head of the School of Corporate Governance, Indian Institute of Corporate Affairs. Dr. Bhattacharya started the Centre for Corporate Governance at IIM Calcutta. He is a regular columnist for Business Standard for the last 12 years. | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Issues related to corporate governance (CG) came into prominence in the USA with the separation of control from ownership, highlighted by Brealey and Means in 1932.1 At that time equity (risk capital) in most companies was provided by dispersed shareholders. These shareholders had neither the capability nor the interest in controlling the use of the assets held by the company. Therefore, professional managers enjoyed 100 percent control over assets with trivial rights on the cash flows generated by the use of those assets. As a result, the agency problem arises in CG. Like an agent, the manager expropriates the shareholders’ wealth to enrich himself using the residual decision making powers.2 In a principal-agent relationship, a complete contract cannot be written as all contingencies cannot be foreseen; even if anticipated, they cannot be articulated unambiguously. In a business, contingencies arise daily. Therefore, the manager enjoys huge residual rights. CG issues come to focus again and again when corporate frauds and scandals are reported. CG practices evolve to protect the interest of shareholders. The basic premise, which is that the manager enriches himself by expropriating shareholder’s wealth unless effectively monitored, continues. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | The Financial Research and Trading Laboratory (FRTL), IIM Calcutta | en_US |
dc.subject | Corporate governance (CG) | en_US |
dc.subject | Brealey and Means | en_US |
dc.subject | Shareholders | en_US |
dc.subject | Corporate law | en_US |
dc.subject | Enlightened stakeholder value(ESV) | en_US |
dc.subject | CORPORATE SECTOR | en_US |
dc.subject | NIFTY | en_US |
dc.subject | Sensex | en_US |
dc.subject | Foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) | en_US |
dc.subject | Foreign institutional investments (FII) | en_US |
dc.subject | SEBI CG Code | en_US |
dc.subject | Related party transactions (RPT) | en_US |
dc.subject | National Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA) | en_US |
dc.subject | International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) | en_US |
dc.title | Corporate Governance: Challenges during and Post Covid 19 | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Issue 2, August 2020 (8th Anniversary Issue) |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Corporate Governance.pdf | Corporate Governance: Challenges during and Post Covid 19 | 24.6 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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