Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ir.iimcal.ac.in:8443/jspui/handle/123456789/3330
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dc.contributor.authorBiswas, Indranil
dc.contributor.authorAdhikari, Arnab
dc.contributor.authorBiswas, Baidyanath
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-27T09:10:35Z
dc.date.available2021-08-27T09:10:35Z
dc.date.issued2020-12
dc.identifier.issn0304-0941 (print version) ; 2197-1722 (electronic version)
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s40622-020-00267-1
dc.identifier.urihttps://ir.iimcal.ac.in:8443/jspui/handle/123456789/3330
dc.descriptionIndranil Biswas, Operation Management Area, Indian Institute of Management Lucknow, Off Sitapur Road, Prabandh Nagar, Lucknow, 226013, India; Arnab Adhikari, Operation Management Group, Indian Institute of Management Ranchi, Suchana Bhawan, Ranchi, Jharkhand, 834008, India; Baidyanath Biswas, Information Technology and Quantitative Techniques Area, International Management Institute Kolkata, 2/4 C, Judges Ct Rd, Alipore, Kolkata, West Bengal, 700027, India
dc.descriptionp.415-429
dc.descriptionIssue Editor – Arnab Adhikari & Adrija Majumdar
dc.description.abstractIn the age of rapid technological advancement and digitization, coordination strategy remains an important issue for the supply chain. Additionally, the uncertainty caused by the disruption often induces the risk aversion in the supply chain members. Motivated by this issue, here we propose a coordination mechanism for a risk-averse supply chain using mean–variance approach. Here, we consider both centralized and decentralized cases and show that our analysis holds good for a central planner as well as for a decentralized supply chain under channel coordinating contracts such as buyback and revenue-sharing schemes. With the help of theoretical and numerical analysis, we exhibit how an individual supply chain agent’s risk aversion behavior can impact the contracts selection mechanism - from the profitability perspective. We extend our analysis to a dyadic setting to a single-supplier multiple-retailer network and confirm that pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists when all the retailers are risk-averse with varying risk attitude.
dc.publisherIndian Institute of Management Calcutta, Kolkata
dc.relation.ispartofseriesVol.47;No.4 (Special Issue on Emerging technologies and operational analytics)
dc.subjectSupply chain
dc.subjectRisk aversion
dc.subjectMean variance approach
dc.subjectBuyback contract
dc.subjectRevenue sharing contract
dc.titleChannel coordination of a risk-averse supply chain: a mean–variance approach
dc.typeArticle
Appears in Collections:Issue 4, December 2020

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