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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Biswas, Indranil | |
dc.contributor.author | Adhikari, Arnab | |
dc.contributor.author | Biswas, Baidyanath | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-08-27T09:10:35Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-08-27T09:10:35Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-12 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0304-0941 (print version) ; 2197-1722 (electronic version) | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1007/s40622-020-00267-1 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://ir.iimcal.ac.in:8443/jspui/handle/123456789/3330 | |
dc.description | Indranil Biswas, Operation Management Area, Indian Institute of Management Lucknow, Off Sitapur Road, Prabandh Nagar, Lucknow, 226013, India; Arnab Adhikari, Operation Management Group, Indian Institute of Management Ranchi, Suchana Bhawan, Ranchi, Jharkhand, 834008, India; Baidyanath Biswas, Information Technology and Quantitative Techniques Area, International Management Institute Kolkata, 2/4 C, Judges Ct Rd, Alipore, Kolkata, West Bengal, 700027, India | |
dc.description | p.415-429 | |
dc.description | Issue Editor – Arnab Adhikari & Adrija Majumdar | |
dc.description.abstract | In the age of rapid technological advancement and digitization, coordination strategy remains an important issue for the supply chain. Additionally, the uncertainty caused by the disruption often induces the risk aversion in the supply chain members. Motivated by this issue, here we propose a coordination mechanism for a risk-averse supply chain using mean–variance approach. Here, we consider both centralized and decentralized cases and show that our analysis holds good for a central planner as well as for a decentralized supply chain under channel coordinating contracts such as buyback and revenue-sharing schemes. With the help of theoretical and numerical analysis, we exhibit how an individual supply chain agent’s risk aversion behavior can impact the contracts selection mechanism - from the profitability perspective. We extend our analysis to a dyadic setting to a single-supplier multiple-retailer network and confirm that pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists when all the retailers are risk-averse with varying risk attitude. | |
dc.publisher | Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Kolkata | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Vol.47;No.4 (Special Issue on Emerging technologies and operational analytics) | |
dc.subject | Supply chain | |
dc.subject | Risk aversion | |
dc.subject | Mean variance approach | |
dc.subject | Buyback contract | |
dc.subject | Revenue sharing contract | |
dc.title | Channel coordination of a risk-averse supply chain: a mean–variance approach | |
dc.type | Article | |
Appears in Collections: | Issue 4, December 2020 |
Files in This Item:
File | Size | Format | |
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Channel coordination of a risk-averse supply chain.pdf Until 2027-03-31 | 395.29 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open Request a copy |
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