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dc.contributor.authorBiswas, Indranil
dc.contributor.authorAvittathur, Balram
dc.descriptionBiswas, Indranil, Operations Management Area, Indian Institute of Management Lucknow, Prabandh Nagar, Off Sitapur Road, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh 226 013, India; Avittathur, Balram, Operations Management Area, Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Diamond Harbour Road, Joka, Kolkata, West Bengal 700 104, India
dc.descriptionISSN/ISBN - 13665545
dc.descriptionDOI - 10.1016/j.tre.2019.01.010
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we demonstrate that options contract coordinates single supplier - multiple buyer supply chain network and can eliminate channel conflict stemming from simultaneous price and inventory competition. We show that a pure strategy unique Nash equilibrium exists for buyers� game and the supplier is able to coordinate the entire supply chain. Our analysis further indicates that options contract provides the supplier with better flexibility in terms of profit allocation compared to buyback contract. We identify a key limitation of this contract: it can coordinate a supply chain only with a limited number of buyers.
dc.publisherTransportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
dc.publisherElsevier Ltd
dc.subjectNash equilibrium
dc.subjectOptions contract
dc.subjectSupply chain management
dc.titleChannel coordination using options contract under simultaneous price and inventory competition
Appears in Collections:Operations Management

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