A dynamic spectrum management strategy based on cooperative bargaining framework

Abstract

This work proposes a dynamic and fair spectrum management strategy to be adopted by a service provider (SP). Here, we consider a scenario where multiple access networks (ANs) of different (not necessarily competing) technologies are owned by a single SP. We envisage that an SP employs an entity, called local spectrum controller (LSC), which manages a common pool of spectrum and is responsible for distributing the spectrum to individual ANs in a fair manner. Since the available spectrum is inadequate to satisfy the aggregate demand from all ANs simultaneously, LSC has to employ a dynamic spectrum allocation strategy. We have modeled the problem as an n-player cooperative bargaining game and have solved the problem with the help of solution techniques namely, Nash bargaining solution (NBS), Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (KSBS) and modified Thomson bargaining solution (MTBS). We have presented two novel heuristics to compute KSBS and MTBS. Moreover, a suitable utility function for the AN with respect to its received spectrum have been presented. We have also identified possible objectives of LSC (i.e.; SP), namely minimizing overall dissatisfaction (MOD) of heterogeneous network, maintaining equality of distribution (MED) and maximizing proportional fairness (MPF). Finally, we have compared performances of above solutions with max-min fairness solution and Shapley value solution with respect to the above objectives of LSC. � 2013 Elsevier Ltd.